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INTRODUCTION
European Union lawl is characterized by a number of firm
foundations: the supremacy of EU law in the case of conflict
with national law; the direct effect of the fundamental freedoms
and the use of direct effect to ensure that the rights of
individuals are not trodden on by unwilling national
administrations; the duty of sincere co-operation imposed on
the Member States and on the institutions and other bodies of
the European Union; the respect for fundamental rights; the
requirements in terms of equivalence and effectiveness which
* Professor of European Law & jean Monnet Professor, University of Groningen;
Professor at the College of Europe, Bruges; B.A. 1975, M.A. 1979, Oxford University;
M.Sc. 1976 London University (LSE); Barrister (Middle Temple), 1978; LIL.D., Utrecht
University (1985). This contribution builds on my contribution to EUROPE, THE NEW
LEGAL REALIsM: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF HJALTL RASNUSSEN 191-202 (H. Koch ct al. ecds.,
2010), and on my article in 15 EUROPARATTSLIC TIDSKRIFT 310-24 (2012), while taking
full account of significant subsequent developments.
1. The major primary sources of EU law are to be found in the Treaty on
European Union ("TEFU") and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
("TFEU"), and in the Euratorn Treaty. See generally Consolidated Version of the Treaty
on European Union 2012 O.J. C 326/13, [hereinafter TEU post-Lisbon]; Consolidated
Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 2012 O.J. C 326/47,
[hereinafter TFEU].
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European Union law makes of the legal systems of the Member
States; the right to damages for loss caused by breach of EU law,
and more generally the right to an effective judicial remedy. Yet
despite this imposing array of principles, rights and remedies,
the issue of the scope ofjudicial review still gives rise to cause for
concern and remains a blemish on an otherwise robust and well-
ordered system of law. While the Court of Justice of the
European Union has undoubtedly robustly defended the rights
of individuals affected by measures taken by the European
Union's institutions in the area of Common Foreign and
Security Policy, the basic issue of standing to attack European
Union legal acts which affect the interests of persons other than
the addressees of such acts is still the subject of controversy and
the state of the law is still far from satisfactory.
The individual litigant in European Union law has long
faced a notoriously narrow road over the deep chasm of the
abyss of inadmissibility: brave indeed were the souls who
undertook such a perilous journey, for them the road journey
on foot to Santiago de Compostella must have seemed like a day
trip compared with the lesions on the road to Luxembourg.
The Court of Justice has failed adequately or at all to take
account of the chorus of criticism of its interpretation of the
concept of individual concern in relation to standing under
what is now Article 263 TFEU. The Court's head remained,
famously ostrich-like, buried firmly in the sand, and its failure to
respond to the calls for a change of heart represents an
enormous blemish on its record of complying with its own
requirement (also made of the national courts) of the
availability of effective judicial remedies.4 While it was evident
2. See e.g:, Kadi & Al Barakaat Int'l Found. v. Council & Conn'n, joined Cases
402/05 & 415/05. [2008] E.C.R. 1-6351 (hereinafter Kadi): The Queen, on the
application of: M & Others v. H.M. Treasury, Case C-340/08, [2010] E.C.R. 1-3913,
1-2, 65-74 (hereinafter "M")
3. This inage is inspired by the drawing by Annette Elisabeth Klosa on the front
cover of Individuals' Access to fustice Under Commrnunity Law. See generally HANS ROLAND
SCHWTNSFETER, INDIVIDUAL'S ACCFSS TO jUItFICE UNDER COMMUNITY LAW (Diss.,
University of Groningen, 2009).
4. E.g., Parti Ecologiste 'Les Verts' v. European Parliament, Case 294/83. [1986]
E.C.R. I-1339, 11 17, 19, 22-26 (in relation to acts of the EU institutions); See also
Feiwcrda BA v. Produktschap voor Vec en Vices, Case 265/78, [1980] E.C.R. 617,
12-19; Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Cons tabdlary, Case 222/84,
[1986] E.C.R. 1651, 11 16-19. The national courts are thus required to ensure that the
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that the judges were fully aware of the problems, their response
was simply to pass the buck to the Member States in the context
of any modification of the Treaty.5 Even if judges really agree
that something ought to be done, there is always the question
whether they should or could do it themselves or whether it
should be left to the legislator or in this case to the Member
States in an Intergovernmental Conference on amendment of
the Treaty. As is well-known, the approach chosen by the Court
failed to cover the institution in glory; the abandonment of
responsibility simply proclaimed and confirmed the inadequacy
of judicial protection in the European Union's system. Given
that the TFEU now offers in certain circumstances a ray of hope
for private litigants, to what extent has the Court been willing to
transform a ray of hope into a beacon of light? Or are the clouds
still the dominant feature on the horizon ofjudicial protection?
I. BACKGRODAT
The arguments traditionally advanced to justify the Court's
very narrow stance on individual concern in Plaumann & Co v.
ComMission, are principally managerial in nature,8 but they are
also founded on comparison with the approach to judicial
review adopted in relation to the old ECSC Treaty, in particular
as regards Article 33 ECSC.9 The scope of judicial review in EC
law was said to be designed to reflect a balance between the
competing considerations of an absence of well-developed
political controls and flexible management of the Community's
rights conferred by EU law are upheld. E g, Anministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato
v. Simincnthal S.p.A, Case 106/77. [1978] E.C.R. 629, [ 13-18: The Queen v.
Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte: Factortanic Ltd and Others, Case C-213/89.
1990] E.C.R. I-2433, [[ 17-20.
5. See generally Union de Pequcnos Agricultores v. Council, Case C-50/00. [2002]
E.C.R. 1-6677 (hereinafter "UPA"); J6go-Qu6re & Cic SA v. Commission, Case T-
177/01, [2002] E.C.R. II-2365.
6. This background is very brief, as thc saga is well-known. For an extensive
discussion, see generally Laurence W. Gormiley, Judicial Review: Advice for the Deaf' 29
FORDHAM INT'l L-.. 655 (2006).
7. See Plaumann & Co v. Commission, Case 25/62, [1963] E.C.R. 95, 107.
8. The argument of opening the floodgates is a powerful one, but not one which
should prevail against the interest of proper judicial control of the exercise of
legislative and executive power.
9. See Opinion of Advocate General Rociner, Plaumann & Co v. Commission, Case
C-25/62, [1963] E.C.R. I10.
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powers."o While it is undoubtedly the case that the European
Union's political controls are nowadays much more developed
and much more astute than they used to be, nevertheless they
are still less well-developed than in (many of) the Member States
of the European Union. This means that an effective system of
judicial control is even more than normally an essential
safeguard against the abusive exercise of executive power,11 and
it therefore unsurprising that the Court of Justice has
traditionally taken a wide view of the type of acts which may be
open to review.2 Re-reading the early case-law provokes very
mixed emotions because of the Court's rather Janus-faced
attitude to judicial review, not so much having its cake and
eating it, but appearing to be virtuous and open while slamming
the door in the face of challenges to acts of the Institutions as
much as possible: on the one hand the Court appeared willing
to go for a wide-ranging scope of judicial review as regards the
instruments that would be subject to control;' yet on the other
10. See CLARENCE J. MANN, THE FU NCTION OF JUDICIAL DECISTON IN EUROPEAN
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 51 (The Hague, 1972).
11. See, e.g., Mulder et al v. Council & Conimission,,Joined Cases 104/89 & 37/90,
1992] E.C.R. 3126, 1 9, 12, 33; M, [2010] E.C.R. 1-3913, 11 34-74. See generally Kadi,
[2008] E.C.R. 1-6351; Criminal Proceedings against E & F. Case 550/09, [2010] E.C.R.
1-6213, 6270 & 6273-6274.. 11[ 44. 57, 59, 60.
12. See. e.g., Commission v. Council, Case 22/70, [1971] E.C.R. 263, 11 38-50;
International Business Machines Corporation v. Commission, Case 60/81. [1981]
E.C.R. 2639. 11 8-9: Commission v. United Kingdom., Case 114/86 [1988] E.C.R. 5289.
1112-14; Luxembourg v. European Parliament, joined Cases 213/88 & 39/89, [1991]
E.C.R. 5643. 11[ 13-15: Reynolds Tobacco & Others v. Commission, Case C-131/03,
[2006] E.C.R. I-7795, 1 355-57.
13. More recently, the General Court recalled that the: "Community institutions
cannot, icrely by means of their choice of kgal instrumilnt, deprive individuals of the
judicial protection which is afforded to thein by the Treaty, even if that legal
instrument is a directive (orders in Case T-223/01 Japan Tobacco andJ Internationalv
Parliament and Council [2002] ECR 11-3529, paragraph 28; Case T-154/02 Vlliger Sdhnev
Council [2003] ECR 11-1921, paragraph 39: Case T-213/02 SN Fv Commission [2004] ECR
11-3047, paragraph 54; and the order of 25 April 2006 in Case T-310/03 Kreazer Medien
v Parliament and Council. not published in the ECR, paragraphs 40 and 41). Similarly,
the mre fact that the Contested provisions form part of a neasure of general
application which constitutes a real directive and not a decision, within the meaning of
the fourth paragraph of Artidce 249 EC, taken in the forin of a directive is not of itsclf
sufficient to exclude the possibility that those provisions may be of direct and
individual concern to an applicant (see, to that effect, the orders in Japan Tobacco and
JT International v Parliament and Council paragraph 30, and in Case T-321/02
Vannieuwenhuyze-M~orin v Parliament and Council [2003] ECR II-1997, paragraph 21)."
Arcelor SA v. European Parliament & Council, Case C-1 6/04, [2010] E.C.R. 1-211, 1 94.
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hand the Court has always taken an extraordinarily narrow view
of individual concern. 4 Yet even though the Court of Justice has
been willing to accept that in the evaluation of acts involving
economic policy choices the Union's institutions and other
bodies had to be allowed a certain margin of discretion, that
discretion was not unfettered so as to leave individuals entirely at
the mercy of the institutions.1
The concept of direct concern as one of the two criteria for
parties other than addressees of acts to challenge acts of the
institutions relatively quickly settled down to an examination of
whether the act concerned had direct legal consequences for
the applicant, and whether the addressee of an act had a
discretion as to whether to comply with it, or had already made
plain how it would proceed if the act were to be addressed to
it,"b an approach that, it is submitted, is unexceptionable.
But the devil lay in the Court's approach to the second
criterion, individual concern. It has always appeared wholly
unconvincing and in market terms even quite outrageous to say
merely that anyone at any time could import clementines, and
that there was nothing to distinguish the Plaumann firm from
the rest of the world. The fact of the matter is that only a certain
number of firms actually import clementines or would even
think of doing so within a relatively narrow appeal window of
two months (plus extension on account of distance); just as in
reality only a certain number of persons are actually engaged in
sugar refining. Thus if their identity is known in advance, even if
14. See generally Plaumann, [ 1963] E.C.R. 95.
15. See, e.g., SA Roquette Frres v. Council, Case 128/79, [1980] E.C.R. I-3333.
22-27; Remia Bv. Conmission, Case 42/84 [1985] E.C.R. I-2545, 34-38; Ricoh &
Co. Ltd v. Council, Case C-174/87 [1992] E.C.R. I-1335. 69-72: Rica Foods (Free
Zone) NV v. Commission. Case C-40/03, [2005] E.C.R. 1-6811, 54-55 (in the
absence of manifest error of appraisal or a misuse of powers, or exceeding the bounds
of permitted discretion, the Court will be unwilling to intervene). See also the very
instructive distinction drawn by Leger, Adv. Gen. between discretion of a 'political
nature (action as political authorities, laying down legislation or policy guidelines) and
discretion of a 'technical' nature (action as administLrative authoritics): the intensity of
the CourCs judicial r cview being ess in cases in which the discretion is of a political
nature. See genall, Rica Foods, [2005] F.C.R. 1-6811.
16. See, e.g., Front National v. European Parliament, Case C-486/01. [2004] E.C.R.
1-6289, 6326: Regione Siciliana v. Commission. Case C-15/06, [2007] E.C.R. 1-2591,
2607.
2013] 1173
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there is not formally a closed class situation, 7 the sense of
injustice felt by those excluded from consideration of their case
on the merits is manifest; the Court's observation that even
where the Institutions knew (more or less) precisely who would
be affected by a measure, it could not be open to challenge is
wholly inadequate. 8 Thus both Advocate General Jacobs" and
the then Court of First Instance2 1 were entirely right to take on
board the overwhelming criticism of the Plaumann
interpretation of individual concern.21 While there had been a
certain souplesse in regard to particular areas in which a specific
administrative regime had been put in place, and there had
been some apparent chinks in the armour,"2 it rapidly became
apparent that it was not going to lead to a wholesale
reinterpretation of the Treaty provisions. The real problem was
that the Court of Justice would simply not understand-or
perhaps chose to turn the proverbial deaf ear-to the glaringly
obvious point that it was its own interpretation of the concept of
individual concern that was the problem, as opposed to the
wording of the Treaty. It noted that "such an interpretation
cannot have the effect of setting aside the condition in question,
expressly laid down in the Treaty, without going beyond the
jurisdiction conferred by the Treaty on the Community
Courts."2" The buck was then proverbially passed:
17. See e.g., Alfred Toepferv Conmission, joined Cases 106 & 107/63, [1965] E.C.R.
405; Societe C.A.M., SA v. Commision, Case 100/74, [1975] E.C.R. 393.
18. E.g., Zucketfabrik Wtens tdt GmbH v. Council, Case 6/68, [1968] E.C.R. 409,
415.
19. See Extramet Industrie SA v. Council, Case C-358/89. [1991] E.C.R. 1-2501; see
generally, P.4 Case C-50/00, [2002] E.C.R. 1-6677.
20. fig-Qr et Cie SA v. Commission, Case T-177/01. [2002] E.C.R. 11-2365; see also
Gormley, supra note 6 at 669-75. The author argues that the notably strong First
Chamber of the Court of First Instance was well within its rights to challenge the
Plaumnann tcst: moreover, given that Advocate General Jacobs in (PA had expressly
been asked to address the admissibility points in detail (as is clear from his Opinion), it
was open season for discussion. The fact that in P.4 the Court after all shied away from
change but admittcd that other approaches to standing could well be imagined points
to the judgment in UPA being the product of a highly divided court!
21. Advocate, General Jacobs in UP4 cited an impressive list of extrajudicial
writings by members of the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance, see (PA.
[2002] E.C.R. 1-6677 at 6682 n.5; as to exampics of criticism by academic
commentators, see id. at n.6; L.W. Gormley, Judicial Review: Advice for the Deaf/, 29
FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 655, 664 (2006).
22. See id. at 662-63 (giving some classic examples).
23. UA, [2002] ECR 1-6677 at 6735 [43.
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While it is, admittedly, possible to envisage a system of
judicial review of the legality of Community measures of
general application different from that established by the
founding Treaty and never amended as to its principles, it is
for the Member States, if necessary, in accordance with
Ar ticle 48 EU, to reform the system currently in force.24
The Court of Justice could simply have approved the Court
of First Instance's redefinition of individual concern in figo-
Quir: that would not have required a change in the Treaty, but
would have been simply a welcome evolution in the case-law.
Evolution is not wholly unknown even in Luxembourg, and the
Court has been willing to change its mind in other cases, even if
this is indeed an extremely infrequent occurrence.25 However,
the Court clearly felt that if there was to be a change, it had to
be made at the level of the Treaty. Such a choice-to act
judicially or to leave a matter to the legislator-is often a
difficult one for judges, but it arose essentially because the Court
failed to understand where the problem really lay. That deaf ear
remained resoundingly deaf in the judgment on appeal in
UPA. 2G
Nevertheless, an implicit invitation to the Member States to
consider the matter was made. That implicit invitation did not
fall entirely on stony ground: in results of the deliberations of
the discussion circle on the Court of Justice in the
Intergovernmental Conference that produced the ill-fated
Constitution,2 standing for appeals against regulatory acts not
entailing implementing measures was subject only to the
24. Id., at [44.
25. E.g., Brasserie de Haecht SA v. Wilkin, Case 48/72. [1973] E.C.R. 77; SA CNL-
SUCAL NV v. Hag AG. Case C-10/89, [1990] E.C.R. I-3711; Keck & withouard joined
Cases C-267 & 268/91. [1993] E.C.R. I-6097.
26. See UTPA. [2002] E.C.R. I-6677. That the Court of Justice was piqued by the
Court of First Instance jumping the gun seems apparent, but there are many reasons
why the Court of Justice should not have been afraid to follow the line taken by the
Court of First Instance. The formulation adopted by the Court of First Instance would
have been sullicient to prevent someone from having to break the law to challenge it-
the fishermen could thus have challenged a regulation which prevented them from
doing what they had hitherto done (it affected their legal position, in a manner which
was both delinite and immediate, by restricting their rights or imposing obligations on
them (i.e. not to fish with nets which failed to meet prescribed specifications).
27. Draft Treaty Establishing a (osLitution for Europe, (never ratified), art. Ill-
365(4), 2004 O.J. C 3 10/1, at 3 10/ 160.
2013] 1175
1176 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 36:1169
condition of the act being of direct concern to the applicant.28
This terminology is now contained in the fourth paragraph of
Article 263 TFEU.
I. THE RAY OF HOPE?
The revised fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU is just
one of a number of improvements made to judicial review in EU
law under Article 263 TFEU. Before discussing the meaning of
the term 'a regulatory act', it is perhaps useful to recall the other
new elements in Article 263.2 The first of these is the distinction
drawn between legislative acts and other acts."' The actual
instruments that may be used by the institutions in exercising
the Union's competences are unchanged: regulations, directives
and decisions, and the non-binding (and thus not subject to
review) recommendations and opinions. Secondly, acts of the
European Council are now subject to review by the Court on the
same basis as acts of the European Parliament, i.e. acts intended
to have legal effects vis-a-vis third parties.32 Thirdly, there is
specific provision for judicial review of the legality of acts of
bodies, offices or agencies of the Union intended to have legal
effects vis-a-vis third parties; in these cases the acts establishing
28. As to the discussions in the Discussion Circe, see Gormlcy, supra note 6 at 684;
SCHWTNSFETER, supra note 3 at 332 (citing additional literature and sources).
29. In addition to the changes discussed in the text, the Committee of the Regions
becomes a semi-privileged litigant; it seems very odd that the opportunity was not taken
at the same time to confer such status on the Economic and Social Committee (which
has the right to be consulted on various proposed legislation). See generally, JEAN-
CLAUDE PIRIS. THE LISBON TREATY: A LEGAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 230-234
(Cambridge Univ. Press, 2010) (outlining the changes which were made to the Court);
S. van der Jeught, 'Le Traite de Lisbonne et la Cour dej ustice de l'Union Europenne, 17J1. DE
DRoIT EUROPEEN 297, 297-303 (2009); 1. PLRNICL, DER VERTRAG VON LISSABON:
REFORM DER EU OHNE VERFASSUNG? (Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2008); M. Dougan, The
Treaty ofLisbon 2007: Wning Minds, Not Hearts, 45 COMMON MARKET L. REV. 677 2008;
Laura Parret, Li Wat Alet de R chIebeherming?57 SOCLAAL-ECONOMISCHL TVETGLVING
103 (2009).
30. Legislative acts are legal acts adopted by lkgislative procedure. See TFEU, supra
note 1, art. 289(3), 2012 O.J. C 326/47 at 172. Such procedure will be the ordinary
legislative procedure, id. art. 289(1), art 294, at 174, or a special legislative procedure.
id.,art. 289(2), at 172.
31. Id. art. 288, at 171-72.
32. The European Council cannot exercise legislative iunctions. See TEU post-
Libson, supra note 1, art. 15(1), 2012 OJ. C 236 at 23. It does however have the power
of decision. See c.g. id. art. 15(5); id. art. 18(1), id. at 26; id. art. 22(1), at 29: id. art.
26(1), at 31; id. art. 48(3),(6) at 42; id. art. 49(1), at 43; id. art. 50(3), at 44.
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those bodies, offices or agencies may lay down specific
conditions or arrangements concerning actions brought by
natural or legal persons against their acts. Fourthly, even if
logically the third change, the specific provisions relating to acts
against which natural or legal persons may institute proceedings
have been tidied up and a new category of acts open to
challenge has been added, so that the fourth paragraph of
Article 263 TFEU reads:
Any natural or legal person may, under the conditions laid
down in the first and second paragraphs, institute
proceedings against an act addressed to that person or
which is of direct and individual concern to them and
against a regulatory act which is of direct concern to them
and does not entail implementing measures. 34
All these changes make subtle but concrete improvements
and for the most part clarify and indeed simplify its terms.
But undoubtedly the greatest interest is in relation to
regulatory acts, in respect of which clarity is less than
convincingly evident. Two points are of interest: what is meant
by the term 'a regulatory act, and what is meant by the
additional phrase 'and does not entail implementing measures?
There is no reason to suppose that the linking phrase 'which is
of direct concern to them' should be given a different
interpretation than hitherto, and indeed that has been the
approach of the General Court in all the cases before it so far.3
But before turning to what the General Court has decided, some
preliminary observations are appropriate.
On one view it can be argued that a regulatory act is any
binding act that is not a legislative act. 6This view is really does
33. See TFEU, supra note 1, art. 263, 2012 O.J. C 326, at 162.
34. Id.
35. This is implicit in the General Court's Order in Inuit Tapirt Kanatami v.
Earopean Parliament & Coun cl. Case T-18/10 [01] E .C.R.,5599 50. This is expressly
dcalt with in its judgment in Microban International Limited v. Commission. Case 1-
262/10. [2011] E.C.R. 11-7697. 1[ 31-32. There is absolutely no ground for
interpreting the concept of direct concern in the last part of the fourth paragraph of
Artile 263 TFEU in a different manner than it is interpreted earlier in that paragraph;
the old case-law applies in both Contexts. In her Opinion in huit Tapiriit Kanatami,
Advocate General Kokott took the sane view: Case C-583/1 1 P, ,1 29-31 (delivered Jan.
17, 2013). (The printed ECRs are no longer produced after the end of 2011.)
36. In relation to the sane rmin in Art. I-34 of the Constitution. See e.g. Anthony
Arnull, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS COURT OFJUSTICF 88 (2nd ed. 2006); Antonio
2013] 1177
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seem unduly wide, and it ignores the fact that not every non-
legislative act is regulatory in nature. Various authors have
defended a narrower view, arguing that the term covers binding
acts that are not legislative acts, as long as they are of general
application." However, there seems no good reason why a
decision addressed to an individual could not be deemed a
regulatory act," as when the Commission imposes a competition
prohibition and fine; similarly, State aid decisions are regulatory
in character, as are decisions on European Regional
Development Fund (ERDF), Social Fund or Cohesion Fund
applications. Sometimes general acts may really be hybrid
because of their individual effects, as with regulations adopted
in relation to anti-dumping duties where individual duties are
applied (as opposed to duties per country); again, more general
in nature, countervailing duties against subsidies can also be
viewed as regulatory measures, as can day-to-day acts in the field
of agriculture and fisheries.
Arguments on the basis of the drafting in the Discussion
Circle in the run up to the adoption of the ill-fated Constitution
are, with respect, in fact of very little help. As is well-known, the
Tizzano (2003) Dir. UE 455 at 471. Dougan, supra note 29 at 677-79 points out many
problems. See, e.g., Koen Lenacrts, Le Trait de Lisbonne et la Protectionjuridictionnelle des
Particuliers en Droit de l'Union 45 CAHIERS DE DROIT EUROPELN 711, 725 (2009);
Melchior Wathelet & Jonathan Wildemeersch, Recours en Annulation: Une Premidre
Interpretation Restrictive du Droit d'Action eilargi des Particuliers? 20 J. DW DROIT ELUROPEEN
75 (2012).
37. See, e.g., Rene Barents, The Court oJ justice in the Draft Cons itution, 11
MAASTRICHTJ. ELUR. & COIP. L. 121, 134 (2004); Carlos M. Alves, La Hitrarchie du Drot
Derive Unilateral a la Lumire de la Constitution Europen: Revolution juridique on Sacrfice
an Norminalisme?, 1-2 CAH IERS DE DROIT EUROPEEN 691, 726 (2004).
38. Schwensfcier feels that the term 'regulatory act only covers non-legislative acts
of gencral application (a view apparently shared by the Parliament and the
Commission). See SCHWENSFETER, supra note 3 at 340; Letter from European Union
Commission to the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee (Feb. 26. 2010),
available at http://www.unece.org/cnv/pp/compliance/(2008-32/correspondence/
FrECReplyQuestion_26Feb2010.pdf. But, as is explained in the text below, it is
submitted that this approach is too narrow. See U.N. Econ. & Social Council, Apr. 11-14.
2011, 32nd meeting, available at http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/cnv/pp/
compliance/(-32/ece.mp.pp.c.1.2011.4.add.1_as submitted.pdf (adopted 14 Apr.
2011. See also, Gertjan J. Harryvan & Jan H. Jans, Internal Review of EU Environmental
Measures 3 EUR. REV ADMIN. L. 53, 63 (2010). Christoph Werknis ter, S tephan PCtters,
aind John s Traut give an interesting discussion of the meaning of regulatory acts
looking at the different language versions of the TFEU. See Christoph Werkncister, et.
al, Regulatory Acts Within Article 263(4) TFEU A Dissonant Extension of Locus Standi for
Priva Applicants, 13 CAMB. Y. B. EUR. L STUD . 311 (2012).
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wording used in Article 111-365(4) of the Constitution is that
used in the 4th paragraph of Article 263 TFEU. But these
discussions are actually inconclusive, failing to explain why the
term 'regulatory act' was preferred to other suggestions, and
what precisely should be understood by that term.0 It appears,
therefore, that a more pragmatic approach is required: taking
account of what an act seeks to do, rather than the name given
to it, looking to the effects of the measure rather than merely to
its form.
III.]UDICL4L RESPONSES: MORNING CLOUDS
Two decisions of the General Court cast important light on
the meaning of regulatory measures. First, in Case T-18/10 Inuit
Tapiriit Kanatani et al v European Parliament & Council a number
of representatives of the Inuit and various trading companies
sought the annulment of Regulation 1007/200941) which imposes
a ban on the importation and sale of seal products, save 'only
where the seal products result from hunts traditionally
conducted by Inuit and other indigenous communities and
contribute to their subsistence.' The other exceptions in the
regulation are not relevant here. The General Court, dealing
with the case by way of an Order,4 1 had to consider the meaning
of a 'regulatory act'. It noted that the fourth paragraph of
Article 263 TFEU permitted a natural or legal person to institute
proceedings against:
an act addressed to that person;
a legislative or regulatory act of general application which is
of direct and individual concern to that person, and certain
acts of general application, namely regulatory acts which are
of direct concern to the person concerned and do not entail
implementing measures.
The General Court found that this third group was not
restricted to delegated legislation, but covered any regulatory
act. On the basis of the history of the adoption of Article III-
365(4) of the Convention, it found that the intention was to
39. See SCHWENSFEITER, Supra note 3 at 337-39.
40. Council Regulation No. 1007/2009/E( on Trade in Scal Products, 2009 O.J. L
286/36.
41. Inuit, [2011] E.C.R. 1l-5599, 1 38-40
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draw a clear distinction between legislative and regulatory acts.
The idea was to avoid the situation so clearly criticised by
Advocate General Jacobs in which an individual would be forced
to break the law to have access to the courts. For legislative acts,
the old requirements of direct and individual concern still
stood, however. The conclusion was that 'regulatory acts' meant
all acts of general application apart from legislative acts. The
Court then went on to consider whether the applicants could
satisfy the old direct and individual concern arguments: it found
some of the applicants were directly concerned, on the ground
that they were active in the placing on the EU market of seal
products and affected by the general prohibition of the placing
on the market of those products. Those whose business activity
was not such placing on the EU market and/or those covered by
the Inuit or other indigenous people exception were not
directly concerned. The finding of direct concern for four of the
applicants was to no avail, however, as they were found not to be
individually concerned within the Plauman doctrine.
In its second decision, and the first judgment on this
question, in Microban International Ltd et al v Commission, 2 the
General Court dealt with additives which could be used in the
manufacture of plastic materials and articles intended to come
into contact with foodstuffs, particularly dealing with the
product 'triclosan'. That product had been included in the
provisional list of additivesi? However, following withdrawal of
the application by its manufacturer for authorisation, the
Commission removed that product from the list, while
permitting its use for a transitional period.44 Unsurprisingly, the
manufacturer did not contest that decision. Microban was a
producer of additives designed to provide protection in a range
of products designed to come into contact with foodstuffs.4 The
Commission argued that the decision was not a regulatory act.
42. Microban, [2011] FC.R. II-7697, 11 1-10.
43. This provisional list is provided for by a Commission Directive. See
Commission Directive 2002/72/EC 2002 0.J. L 220/18, Annex III.
44. Commission Decision No. 2010/169, 2010 0.j. L 75/25.
45. In his perceptive case note on Microban, Matthijs van Wolferen argues that the
reason why Microban suffered damage was that the producer withdrew its application
for approval of "triclosan." (2012/5) 13 EHRC 41 at 52. However, the lkgal effect on
Microban was directly as a result of the Commission's reaction to that withdrawal,
which was a standard response.
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The General Court disagreed, finding that the decision
concerned was adopted in pursuance of powers conferred on
the Commission to adopt implementing measures; the decision
was not legislative in character, but applied to objectively
determined situations and produced legal effects relating to
categories of persons considered in general and in the abstract.
Anyone engaged in the production and/or marketing of
'triclosan' and materials and articles containing it would be
affected by the ban on its marketing within the EU from 1
November 2011. Rightly, in view of the aim of the fourth
paragraph of Article 263 TFEU to open up standing
requirements (at least to an extent), the General Court refused
to interpret direct concern in the last part of that provision in
any manner other than the traditional one, which applied to the
first mention of that term. Accordingly, the General Court
found Microban directly concerned in relation to a regulatory
act not entailing implementing measures and then proceeded to
annul the decision on two grounds: the wrong choice of legal
basis and, for good measure, the total absence of any legal basis
at all for the decision!
These decisions show that the General Court has taken the
narrower view of what constitutes a regulatory measure,
following inter alios Schwensfeier and the Commission in
emphasising the need for the act to be of general application as
well as non-legislative in nature.
While the judgment of the General Court in Microban was
not appealed, the judgment of the General Court in Inuit was,
and Advocate General Kokott delivered her Opinion on the
appeal on 17January 2013.46 Opining that the appeal should be
dismissed, she dealt initially with the General Court's
interpretation of the expression 'regulatory act'. She had little
difficulty in concluding that it would be inappropriate to
embrace legislative acts within the term 'regulatory acts' and
thus she approved the General Court's characterisation of
'regulatory acts' as all European Union acts of general
application other than legislative acts. She noted that the
applicants' arguments were conceptually ill-founded: not all
46. See generally, Opinion of Advocae Gencral Kokott, mit Tapirit Kanatami,
[2013] F.C.R. I (deliveredJan. 17, 2013) (not yet reported).
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regulations, directives or decisions were adopted through a
legislative procedure; the argument that a 'regulatory act' was
clearly different from a legislative act was likewise unconvincing,
as was the argument that implementing measures were not
covered by the distinction between legislative and non-legislative
acts. For good measure, she noted that today a challenge to a
Commission implementing measure in the fisheries sector
would be open to a firm in a situation analogous to that in jgo-
Quire, although a litigant in the UPA sitation would be left to the
route of challenging either implementing measures adopted by
the Commission or implementing measures adopted by the
national authorities. She then examined whether the applicants
surmounted the ordinary hurdles of direct and individual
concern, finding that they failed to take these hurdles.
III. COMMEN\TS AND PROBLEMS
Neither the General Court nor the learned Advocate
General attempted to give any reason for requiring legislative
acts to be of general application. The legislative history in the
papers from the Discussion Circle on the Court during the
Constitutional Convention does not support confining the term
'regulatory act' to acts of general application (a formulation in
terms of acts of general application was actually rejected);47 it
does, of course support the distinction being drawn between
legislative and regulatory acts.4 8 In fact, there is no good reason
to confine regulatory acts to acts of general application at all.
However, the General Court did not seek to justify itself, given
that it was unnecessary to deal with the issue of a wider criterion
in order to resolve the dispute in Microban. There are plenty of
acts that, though not legislative in nature, and not of general
application, are clearly regulatory in nature. A competition
decision addressed to an undertaking, for example, is essentially
regulatory and addressed to specific persons; under long-
47. See SCHWENSFEER, Supra note 3 at 337-39.
Advocate General Wathlet has however opined in Stichting Woonlinie et al v
Commission, Case C-133/12 P, 1 29-30 (Opinion delivered on 29 May 2013) that the
real distinction in the TFEU is between legislative and implementing acts., observing
that non-legislative acts are referred to in art. 297(2) TFEU as 'non-legislative acts'. He
took the view that the measures had to be of general application, whether it were a
legislative act or not (1 38).
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standing case-law, complainants and others who have taken a
substantial part in the procedure, can attack the act, but under
the new fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU it may well be
that those with a broader competitive relationship would now
also be admissible, because the old more restrictive approach in
Cases 10 & 18/68 Societa 'Eridania' Zuccherifici Nazionali v.
Comnmission49 would not apply to regulatory measures (as only
direct concern is required). However, there is no suggestion that
the whole world could attack, say, a decision appointing an
individual to a particular position, or a competition decision,
and the existing criteria for direct concern should be enough to
see off mere busybodies, while enabling a wider range of
persons to challenge regulatory acts which do not involve
implementing measures.
Under Ai ticle 290 (1) TFEU, " [A] legislative act may
delegate to the Commission power to adopt non-legislative acts
of general application to supplement or amend certain non-
essential elements of the act."5" On the basis of Microban, it
appears that replacement of an annex, or additions to or
deletions from a positive or negative list will relatively speedily
be regarded as regulatory. It would appear that the actual act
amending the legislative act could be open to challenge more
widely than the legislative act being amended was, no matter
how strange that might seem at first sight. The justification must
be sought in the specificity of the amendment, even though its
effect is of general application to prohibit the manufacture and
marketing of the product concerned: the amendment is
essentially hybrid in nature.
Taking but one concrete example, adaptation to technical
progress, such as in the form of revision of the REACH
regulation' 1 is just one out of many areas in which delegated
acts may well be found to be regulatory in nature. Amendments
49. Eridaniav. Commission, Case 18/68, [1969] E.C.R. 459.
50. The conditions under which delegation takes place will be laid down in the
parent legislative act; they may include the possibility of revocation of the delegation by
the European Parliament or the Council, and/or the subjection of the entry into force
of the delegated act to no objection being raised by the European Parliament or the
Council within a period set by the parent legislative act. See TFEU, supra note 1, art.
290. 2008 0.J. 115.
51. European Parliament & Council Regulation, 2006 O.J. L 396/1, as last
amended by Cuommission Regulation 2012 0.J. L 41/1.
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to the REACH regulation have been taking place under the
comitology procedure prescribed in that regulation, but since 1
March 2011 they take place under the new comitology rules
contained in Regulation 182/2011,52 with the application of the
transitional provisions contained in Article 11 of that latter
regulation. The same is true in relation to other areas where
amendments are still being adopted by old-style implementing
measures under the comitology procedure prescribed in the
parent acts.
However, it is worth recalling that a subtle but explicit
change appears to be taking place in measures taken by the
Commission on the basis of powers conferred now by the
European Parliament and the Council. What used to be called
implementing measures or adaptations to technical progress
adopted under comitology, actually become delegated acts in the
post-Lisbon terminology in certain circumstances. Thus post-
Lisbon implementing acts are not the same as pre-Lisbon
implementing acts: any amendment of non-essential elements of
parent legislation will have to be adopted under the delegated
non-legislative act procedure, as will supplementary measures,
whereas previously this would have been achieved through
implementing measures. New-style implementing measures are
different in nature from those adopted hitherto: they will deal
only with 'uniform conditions for implementing legally binding
Union legislation'. Jean-Claude Piris explains that as delegated
powers involve amendments to legislative acts, supervision is at
the level of the European Parliament and the Council, whereas
implementing legislation 'new style' deals with uniform
implementing conditions, which means legislation which would
otherwise have been adopted at national level; accordingly
supervision would continue to be by committee arrangements.53
52. Council Regulation No. 182/2011 2011 0.. L 55/13 (laying down the rules
and general principles concerning mechanisins for control by Member States of the
Commission's exercise of implementing powers) [hereinafter Implementing Powers
Regulation]. See 2011 O.J. C 206/11 (providing the Standard Rules of Procedures For
Committees); Council Regulation, 2011 O.J. C 183/13 (laying out the rules of
procedure for the appeal committee).
53. PIRIS, supra note 29 at 102-03. See Robert Schutlze, Delegated' Legislation in the
(New) European Union: A Constitutional Analysis 74 MOD. L. REV. 661 (2011) (giving a
constitutional perspective on new-style delegation).
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New style implementing acts adopted by the Commission
(or in duly justified cases and in the cases provided for in
Articles 24 and 26 TEU54 adopted by the Council) may
constitute regulatory acts, but may not, or may do so only in
part; again, it seems that more depends on the context or effects
than on a clear one-categorization-fits-all approach. Some
examples may illustrate the difficulties. The Commission is
empowered under the Customs Code55 to issue (by way of
regulations) binding tariff information, but it has hitherto
proved notoriously difficult to challenge such acts;56 it seems
likely that this situation should change, as this type of act can
typically be characterized as a regulatory act. 7 Although the act
is normative (as a regulation), it is nevertheless clearly not
legislative, as it is not adopted by a legislative procedure. It
appears regulatory in nature as it forms a specific act of general
application designed to govern the actions of customs
authorities of the Member States. The same approach must
apply in respect of binding origin information. Although in
relation to competition, state aids, and dumping there is a well-
defined set of persons whose appeals are admissible even under
existing case-law, there remains, as has been explained above in
relation to competition law, the set of persons who up to now
have not been held to have standing: those in a very general
competitive relationship with the addressee of a decision in the
competition or State aids fields; those who are independent
importers in anti-dumping cases. It is submitted that the concept
of regulatory measures must be wide enough to embrace such
54. These deal with certain matters relating to the ELU's Common Foreign and
Security Policy. See TFEU supra note 1, art. 291 (2), 2012 O.J. L 326/173 & TEU, supra
note 1, arts. 24 & 26. 2012 0.J. L 326/30-31.
55. See LAURENCE W. GORMLEY, EL LAXW OF FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS AN)
CU STOMS LNION (Oxford, 2009). The Community Customs Code is contained in
European Parliament & Council Regulation 2913/92, 1992 OJ L 302/1 as last anended
by Council Regulation 1791/2006, 2006 O.J. L 363/ 1. The Modernised Customs Code
is only partially in force as yet, and then only as regards procedural matters. See
European Parliament & Council Regulation, 2008 O.J. 145/1.
56. A singular exception is Sony Computer Entertainment Europe Limited v.
Commission of the European Conmunities, Case T- 243 /01. [2003] ECR 11-4189. More
typical is the fate of litigants in Apple Computer International v. Commission of the European
Communities, Case T-82/06, [2008] ECR 11-279.
57. See Laurence W. Gormley, Some Problems of the Customs Union and the Internal
Mlarket, in FROM SINGLE MARKET To ECONOMIC UNION ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF JOHN A.
LSHER 87, 90-92 (N. Nic Shuibhne & L.W. Gormley eds., 2012).
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persons, offering them access to the direct route for appeals to
the centralised Union judiciary, as opposed to the indirect route
of persuading a national court to make a reference for a
preliminary ruling.
Sometimes the Commission is empowered to adopt
individual measures in pursuance of a parent regulation.
Examples include novel foods and novel food ingredients;58
nutrition and health claims made for food," and geographical
indications and designations of origin for agricultural products
and foodstuffs.60 Here too, as with decisions in the competition,
State aids and dumping fields, the acts are essentially regulatory,
even if they do not readily fall into the categories of delegated or
implementing acts; they are acts involving the exercise of powers
in a given situation.
If new-style implementing measures necessarily entail
national implementing action, they will continue to be governed
by the traditional approach to standing of the Court of Justice.
Both delegated acts and implementing acts, in so far as they are
regulatory in nature, would benefit from the new approach. But
whether they will depends on the conditions of the second point
being fulfilled.
Turning now to the second point, the term 'implementing
measures' must be understood, it is submitted, as covering any
implementing measures, whether at Union level or at national
level. 6' This certainly excludes directives, as they always require
implementing measures at national level.62 Sometimes other EU
acts may in one or more provisions expressly compel or
authorize the Member States to adopt particular measures or
types of measures. Would the inclusion of such obligations in a
58. European Parliament & Council Regulation 258/97, 1997 O.J. 1 43/ 1, last
amended by Regulation 596/2009. 2009 O.J. L 188/14.
59. European Parliament & Council Regulation 1924/2006 (O.J. 2006 L 404/9,
corr. O.J. 2007 1, 12/3), last amended by Regulation I16/2010, 2010 . . L, 37/16.
60. Council Regulation 510/2006, 2006 O.J. L 93/12), last amended by
Regulation 417/2008, 2008 O.J. L 125/27) governing the PDO-regiie.
61. Advocate, General Wathlet has opined in Stichting Woonlinie et al v
Commission. Case C-133/12 P. 1 48, (Opinion delivered on 29 May 2013) in relation to
the concept of an act not entailing implementing measures. that such measures should
be removed from the national sphere and confined to Union law, or at least measures
adopted by the national authotities without there being any discretion on their part,
should not be covered by this concept.
62. See van der jeught, supra note 29, at 300.
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non-legislative act of general application defeat any attempt to
challenge other aspects of the act? The Implementing
Regulation for the Customs Code" is a good example of an area
in which such complications may occur. It is also unclear just
what implementing measures are, certainly at the national level.
Suppose that a decision is issued by the Commission on binding
tariff information or binding origin information and is then
applied by national customs offices to the products concerned.
Is the application of that decision to a concrete case an
implementing measure within the meaning of Article 263
TFEU? It seems that the better view must be that it is not,
otherwise the new Article 263 TFEU would do nothing to ease
the notorious difficulty in challenging such decisions; in reality
the regulation is being applied in a specific case, as opposed to
being implemented through national measures. Similarly, the
fact that effect is given to anti-dumping measures, for example,
by national customs authorities when they register imports or
collect duties, should not be seen as involving national
implementing measures for the purposes of the fourth
paragraph of Article 263 TFEU. Again, it is difficult to argue that
the act by which a Member State grants a State aid is an
implementing measure of a Commission decision finding the
proposed aid compatible with the internal market (the decision
deals with the compatibility issue and is not itself implemented,
save in the sense that the Member State concerned must comply
with any conditions laid down by the Commission). On the
other hand, a decision requiring a Member State to obtain
repayment of unlawfully granted aid would involve
implementing measures-an enforceable legal act of the
Member State requiring repayment. It is submitted that acts
which are merely carrying out the instructions or the logical
individual consequences of a regulatory act do not prevent the
regulatory act from being open to challenge merely on
demonstration of direct concern.
63. Commission Regulation 2454/93, O.J. 1993 L 253/1. as last amended by
Regulation 1063/2010, 2010 0.). L 307/ 1.
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CONCLUSION
Roland Schwensfeier, after an outstanding consideration of
individuals' access to justice in the EU context, felt that the new
wording of Article 263 TFEU was 'a sham package'.64 On the
basis of the case-law so far, this view may be on the harsh side.
For the reasons advanced above, it is submitted that the General
Court and Advocate General Kokott were, with respect,
misguided in confining the ambit of regulatory acts to acts of
general application. It remains to be seen what the Court of
Justice will make of the appeal in In uit;J in the meantime an
appeal against an Order of the President of the General Court"@
dismissing an application for interim measures to suspend the
operation of Regulation 1007/2009 was dismissed by Order of
the President of the Court of Justice as not being capable of
bringing any advantage to the applicant.67
While the General Court's definition may perhaps suffice
for a great number of cases, the objections advanced above
make it clear that it does not yet go far enough. Bearing in mind
that the whole point of the amendment to standing
requirements was to open up judicial review somewhat, it would
be a retrograde step if the door were again immediately to be
slammed shut as far as possible.
If Inuit and Microban are the indicators that the ray of light
remains a ray, rather than something which will develop into a
beam, they do not advance the cause of effective judicial
protection at the level of the centralised Union judiciary far
enough to give cause for rejoicing. Until such time as the Court
of Justice is prepared to acknowledge that the Plauman
definition of individual concern, while explicable, is
fundamentally flawed, judicial review at European Union level
remains under a cloud. It is to be hoped that the Court of
Justice will eventually set matters right, although it would be
unwise to advise litigants to hold their breath in expectation. As
for the definition of 'regulatory acts', it may well be that the
64. See SCHWENSFLIER, supra note 3 at 341-42.
65. Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami et al v. European Parliament and Council of the European
Union, Case C-583/1 P (delivered jan. 17, 2013).
66. Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami v. European Parliament & Council. Case T-11 U-
INIP, [20111 E-C.R.,(no e vcr porud [
67. Id.
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Court will wait until the facts compel it examine an act which is
not of general application before addressing the issue. It can
always side-step the issue by finding no direct concern.
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